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ISAAC MOLNAR*
In 1993, a hired killer committed a triple homicide using methods found in a
book entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors. In a
wrongful death action against the book's publisher, the Fourth Circuit held that
the First Amendment did not protect the publisher from civil liability. This
Comment contends that the Fourth Circuit, in effect, created a new class of
unprotected speech in which liability attaches based upon the tendency of the
words used. The author argues that the resurrection of this "bad tendency" test
could adversely affect groups advocating unpopular views-most notably, militia
groups. Recognizing the potential conflict with fundamental First Amendment
values, the author proposes a different analytical framework that focuses on the
expressive element of the speech and parallels the tests used to analyze symbolic
and commercial speech. This approach, the author contends, will allow for
greater protection of expressive speech than the Fourth Circuit's approach and
is thus in greater harmony with the essential principles of the First Amendment.
"Is the First Amendment a parasol or an umbrella?"1
I. INTRODUCTION
"Using your six-inch serrated blade knife, stab deeply into the side of the
victim's neck and push the knife forward in a forceful movement. This method
will half decapitate the victim, cutting both his main arteries and wind pipe,
ensuring immediate death."2
* I would like to thank Fred Block, Elizabeth Wewers, and Ann Griffith Millette for their
insightful comments throughout the writing process. I would also like to extend my thanks to
William Cowher and Richard Fliehr for their inspiration. Finally, I'd like to thank my parents,
Bonnie and Dennis Molnar for providing me with the opportunity to write this paper. Everyone
should be so lucky.
I This question was first posed, at least to the author's knowledge, by Professor Stanley K.
Laughlin, Jr. of The Ohio State University College of Law. A parasol is a luxury on a sunny
day, but when the rains come the parasol collapses. The harder the rain, the more useless a
parasol is. Conversely, an umbrella is unnecessary when the skies are blue, but it is sure nice to
have when the skies are awash with thunder and lightening.
2 REX FERAL, Hrr MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACrORS 58
(1983) [hereinafter Hit Man]. The author of this book is actually a woman who has remained
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This passage can be found within the pages of Hit Man: A Technical Manual
for Independent Contractors (hereinafter "Hit Man"). Hit Man was recently
linked to a grisly episode in which a killer, following Hit Man's instructions,
committed a triple murder. This Comment will evaluate a recent decision, arising
from these murders, in which the Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment
does not bar imposition of liability on a publisher for actions taken by another
with the "assistance" of Hit Man.3 This Comment will argue that the Fourth
Circuit, in effect, created a new class of unprotected speech, in which liability
attaches based upon the tendency of the words used. The resurrection of what
traditionally has been referred to as the "bad tendency" test4 has several possible
ramifications. Most prominently, if history teaches anything, resurrection of the
"bad tendency" test can become almost a gag order for unpopular views
expressed during times of "national emergency." 5 Presently, the groups most
likely to be victimized for their unpopular views include militias. Therefore, the
reinstitution of the "bad tendency" test may most significantly be used to strike at
certain types of political speech associated with militia groups.
unidentified. See 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1997) (interviewing Peter
Lund).
3 The author is certainly not alone in expressing an opinion on the Fourth Circuit's
decision. For opinions in support of the court's decision, see Bennett L. Gershman, Perverting
the First Amendment, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1998, at 2; James J. Kilpatrick, Editorial, The Killer
Went by the Book, and the Book Went Too Far, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 20, 1997, at
A21; Cathy Young, Opinion, Free Speech Doesn't Cover Incitement-to-Murder Book, DEW.
NEWS, Dec. 12, 1997, at Al1; Bruce Fein, Commentary, First Amendment Free Press Fiasco,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1997, at A16; Gregory Kane, 'Hit Man' Shatters Free-Speech Limits,
DEN. POST, Nov. 24, 1997, at 1 IB; James S. Keat, Editorial, Taking Exception to Critics ofthe
'Hit Man' Court Ruling, BALT. SUN, Nov. 24, 1997, at 17A; DeWayne Wickham, Freedom On
Trial: Too Much or Too Little?, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 1997, at 15A; Stephen Barr, Terror By
Mail (Books and Products with Violent Intent), GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Jan. 1, 1997, at 76. For
the view that the Fourth Circuit's decision was erroneous, see Robyn Blumner, Editorial, A Hit
on Free Speech: All Publishers Could be Silenced by Ruling on Assassin's Guidebook, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, Dec. 14, 1997, at 1B; Editorial, Free Speech for Scoundrels, SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, Nov. 30, 1997, at C14; Joseph Spear, Censorship: Where Does it Stop?, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 21, 1997, at 15B; Ray Jenkins, Court Ruling Deals Blow to Free Speech,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 17, 1997, at 13A; Editorial, Free Speech Under Attack, DENy. POST, Nov. 17,
1997, at 8B; Editorial, Sleazy Speech, But Speech, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 11, 1997, at 2B.
The Hit Man murders were also the subject of a "60 Minutes" segment. See 60 Minutes (CBS
television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1997).
4 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); infra notes 24-38 and
accompanying text.
5 See generally Debs, 249 U.S. at 211. Debs was a socialist convicted of attempted
obstruction of the draft based on a speech in which he denounced World War I. See id. at 212-
13; see also David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1205, 1258-59 (1983) (observing that even within the context of a prewar
tradition of "judicial hostility" towards free speech claims, Holmes "supported [even] greater
restrictions on speech during times of war").
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In Part I, this Comment will examine the relevant First Amendment law,
with a special emphasis on the rationales and history behind the First
Amendment's political speech doctrine. In Part I, this Comment will briefly
summarize the current case, with an emphasis on the circuit court's analysis. In
Part IV, this Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit was implicitly creating a
new category of speech for instructional speech. Further, this Comment contends
that the Fourth Circuit applied the "bad tendency" test to determine if Hit Man,
and other instructional speech, should receive First Amendment protection.
Finally, in Part V, this Comment will examine the future of instructional speech,
arguing that within the context of the current "national emergency," the "bad
tendency" test will likely be used as a tool to suppress militia speech, irrespective
of its political value. This Comment will also argue that preexisting First
Amendment doctrines more than adequately equip the judiciary with tools
necessary to determine what types of instructional speech should be protected by
the First Amendment
II. RELEVANT FIRST AMENDIMENT LAW
The First Amendment6 offers protection from civil or criminal liability for
speech, unless it falls within a narrowly limited class of unprotected speech.7 Due
to this Comment's emphasis on Hit Man, this section focuses on the narrowly
limited class of words which incite imminent lawless action.8 In defining this
modem class of unprotected speech, it is helpful to understand the historical
developments of the First Amendment, and the rationale behind its relevant
doctrines. A brief explanation of these doctrines and historical developments
follows.
A. Rationale
The defining metaphor of the First Amendment is Holmes's "marketplace of
ideas" in which the "best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
6 "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech... ." U.S. CoNST.
amend. I.
7 These classes are: (1) fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942); (2) libel, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964); (3) obscenity,
see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973); (4) commercial speech, see Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); and (5) words likely
to incite imminent lawless action, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). For an
excellent review of the First Amendment protections afforded various types of speech, see
William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REv. 107
(1982).
8 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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accepted in the competition of the market."9 Holmes argued that the expression of
ideas should only be suppressed when such ideas pose an imminent threat which
necessitates an immediate check to preserve the country. 10 Holmes, along with
Justice Brandeis, reaffirmed this conviction in Gitlow v. New York, 1 saying that
"[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.' 12 Holmes's
faith in the power of truth is a persuasive justification for freedom of speech.
Several other rationales have been offered to explain the value of First
Amendment freedoms.13 The "democracy" rationale asserts that democratic
government is possible only when citizens are able to freely express their views
on political issues.14 The "self realization" rationale 'justifies free speech by
insisting that it is necessary for individual freedom and self-understanding."'15
Furthermore, an "autonomy" rationale values free speech because it facilitates the
ability and responsibility of individuals to develop their rational capacities. 16
9 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10 See id. Holmes stated:
I think we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawfiul and pressing purposes of
the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.
Id.; see also G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech
Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391, 439-40 (1992) (finding
Holmes's conception of truth to be the majoritarian prejudice at any point in time, while those
who emphasized the social interest in speech see truth as informing and enlightening public
opinion).
11 268 U.S. 652 (1924).
12 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). But see Richard Posner, Free Speech
in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) ("If those beliefs are destined
to prevail, free speech is irrelevant").
13 For a brief summary of contemporary First Amendment theory, see Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1617-
27 (1987); David A. J. Richards, A Theory of Free Speech, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1837, 1881-89
(1987).
14 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring) ("Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth ... [and] should be a fundamental principle of the
American government."); Steven D. Smith, Essay, Radically Subversive Speech and the
Authority of Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 348,351 (1995) (describing democracy rationale).
15 Smith, supra note 14, at 352 n.15.
16 For an excellent discussion of autonomy and the First Amendment, see Christina E.
Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1997).
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Because these varying rationales may dictate different determinations of what
speech should be protected under the First Amendment, they are important to
understand. 17
B. Historical Developments
1. World War land the Espionage Act
The early twentieth century, as the United States became involved in World
War I and the Communists seized control in Russia, saw the first significant cases
challenging the extent of First Amendment protection.18 In response to these
events, Congress passed the Espionage Act 19 aimed at socialist sympathizers,
particularly those obstructing the recruiting process.20 In March 1919, the Court
issued four Espionage Act opinions,2 1 unanimously affirming convictions in all
cases,22 and thus maintaining pre-war judicial hostility towards the First
Amendment.2 3
At the forefront of these four cases, at least historically, was Schenck v.
United States.24 The Court in Schenck, through Justice Holmes, stated that speech
was protected25 by the First Amendment unless it was of such a nature and used
17 But see Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 1640 (arguing that a better view of free
speech is as part of"a web of mutually reinforcing values," i.e. self-realization, democracy, and
autonomy, rather than as a tower of values in which there is one more basic value underlying
free speech).
18 See Lawrence F. Reger, Montana's Criminal Syndicalism Statute: An Affront to the
First Amendment, 58 MONT. L. REV. 287, 290 (1997) ("Faced with anti-war movements and
the Red Scare, legislators rushed to quash the advocacy efforts of dissident groups.").
19 Espionage Act, ch. 30, tit. I, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2388 (1976)).
2 0 The organization called the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.), a radical relative
of the Socialist party, was a primary target, sparking numerous statutes suppressing dangerous
speech associated with their anti-war activities. See Reger, supra note 18, at 290-91; see also
Jason Talerman, Note, The Death of Tupac: Gangsta Rap Killed the First Amendment, 14 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 117, 125 (1994) ("[T]he United States responded to the 1917 Communist
overthrow of Tsarist Russia by unleashing a legal and social barrage against all those who
expressed opinions in favor of a socialist regime.").
21 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frowerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919); Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
22 See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1244.
23 See id. at 1265.
24 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
25 Holmes established that not all speech was protected with his classic example of a man
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic. See id at 52. Thus, the Court was forced to
decide what speech fell outside of First Amendment protection.
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in such circumstances as to "create a clear and present danger that [it] will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."26 While Schenck
is considered by some to be the genesis of the clear and present danger test2 7
closer analysis reveals that Holmes was basing his decision on the "bad tendency"
test.2 8 Holmes argued that if actual obstruction of the recruiting service had
occurred, then the speaker would be liable for the effect his words might
produce2 9 Holmes concluded that "[i]f the [speech] act[,] ... its tendency and the
intent with which it was done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that
success alone wan-ants making the act a crime."30 In applying the "bad tendency"
test, Holmes infers intent from the "probable consequences and surrounding
circumstances of speech."31 This enabled Holmes to conclude that Schenck had
the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of conspiracy to obstruct the draft.32
A week after Schenck was issued, the Court held that a Socialist's 33 speech
advocating obstruction of the recruiting service was unprotected by the First
Amendment.34 The Court, again speaking through Justice Holmes, reiterated that
a court can infer intent from the tendency of the words, stating that "if in that
speech he [Debs] used words tending to obstruct the recruiting service he meant
that they should have that effect." 35 Further, Holmes suggested that the
encouragement present in Debs's speech need not be direct,36 endorsing the lower
court's jury instruction requiring Debs's conviction if he had a specific intent
(inferred from the tendency of his speech) to use "words [that] had as their natural
tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service."37
26 Id. at 52. Schenck circulated a pamphlet denouncing the constitutionality of
conscription to men who had been called and accepted military service. See id. at 49. The
pamphlet pronounced: "If you do not assert your rights [to oppose the draft], you are helping to
deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens... to retain?' Id. at 51.
27 See Reger, supra note 18, at 292.
28 See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1259.
29 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
30 Id. (emphasis added). See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1261 (pointing out that the above
quoted sentence is where "Holmes recurred to the 'bad tendency' doctrine").
31 Rabban, supra note 5, at 1261.
32 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
33 The speaker was former presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs. Running for the fifth
time as the Socialist candidate for President, Debs received over 900,000 votes in 1920. See
Harry Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235,
237 (1973).
34 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,216 (1919).
35 Id. (emphasis added).
36 See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1264.
37 Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. It is important to note the Court's sole consideration is the
tendency of Debs's words to do harm--obstruction of the recruiting service. Nowhere in the
opinion does the Court mention the value of this type of political discourse. The implication
being that so long as speech tends to produce a harm, the government has an interest in
1338 [Vol. 59:1333
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Thus, the "bad tendency" test, as articulated in Schenck and Debs, allowed a jury
to infer intent, encouragement, and the attempted act through the natural tendency
of that speaker's words.38
2. McCarthyism and the Smith Act
The next significant development in defining protected speech under the First
Amendment arose in response to statutes aimed at quelling speech in response to
the perceived "national emergencies" of the McCarthy era-the Cold War and
communism.3 9 The signature case of this period was Dennis v. United States.4° In
Dennis, the Smith Act41 was first challenged as unconstitutionally infringing
upon the First Amendment.42 The defendants were indicted for (1) knowingly
organizing the Communist Party4 3 a group known to advocate the violent
overthrow of the Government of the United States, and (2) knowingly advocating
and teaching the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the
preventing it, and thus, it can be proscribed irrespective of its value. See infra note 226.
38 See Donald L. Beschle, An Absolutism that Works: Reviving the Oiginal "Clear and
Present Danger" Test, 1983 S. ILL. U. LJ. 127, 133 (arguing that Schenck and Debs make it
clear that Holmes's concept of punishable speech is functionally the "bad tendency test");
Kalven, supra note 33, at 236 ("The start of the law of the first amendment is not Schenck, it is
Schenck and Debs read together.").
3 9 See Talerman, supra note 20, at 126 (concluding that the fight against communism in
Korea, and the Senate hearings inspired by Senator Joseph McCarthy caused the First
Amendment to undergo a regression in protection from which it did not fully rebound until the
Vietnam War era).
40 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
41 Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(1994)). Among other things, the Smith Act made it illegal for any person "to knowingly or
willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach" the necessity of overthrowing the United States
government by force. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994).
42 See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme
Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 57
(1996) (reviewing the Court's avoidance of constitutional issues in deciding cases that arose
under the Smith Act in the 1950s).
43 See United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494,497 (1951). The Court noted that the court
of appeals found the record to support the following conclusions:
[Tjhe Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into
strategic positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning language; that the Party is rigidly
controlled; that Communists, unlike other political parties, tolerate no dissension from the
policy laid down by the guiding forces;-.. that the literature of the Party and the
statements and activities of its leaders ... advocate, and the general goal of the party was,
during the period in question, to achieve a successful overthrow of the existing order by
force and violence.
1998] 1339
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
Government of the United States.44 The majority stated that the test of First
Amendment protection must be "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger. '45 In upholding these convictions, the Court apparently viewed world
communism as such a grave danger as to make speech associated with its spread
unprotected by the First Amendment.46
The doctrine adopted in Dennis was refined to protect more speech as
McCarthyism died out, and the fervor of the Red Scare waned.47 In Yates v.
United States48 the Court distinguished Dennis, holding that abstract advocacy
was entitled to First Amendment protection, while more direct advocacy was
not.4 9 The Court later held that there must be a present advocacy of the violent
overthrow of the government and not merely the possibility of future advocacy to
obtain a conviction under the Smith Act.50 The Court had weathered the
McCarthyism scare, and was now returning to a more inclusive approach to the
First Amendment.
C. The Modern Law
The modem restatement of the clear and present danger test51 was articulated
Id. at 498.
44 See id. at 497.
45 Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 E2d 201,212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
46 See Kloppenberg, supra note 42, at 68 (arguing that the context of the "political
atmosphere of 1951" was an important factor in the Court's perception of Communism).
47 The Red Scare in this instance refers to the domestic concerns during the early 1950s
about Communist infiltration into entertainment, business, and the military. See David Crump,
Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the
Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) ('The year was 1957, and although sentiment
against Communism remained strong, the times had changed. The country had been made
aware of the dangers of excess by such events as the censure of Senator McCarthy.").
48 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
49 See id. at 308. The requirements of Yates were later found to apply to the Smith Act.
See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1961). Smith Act convictions could be
sustained if there was teaching of forceful overthrow and a form of conduct: either (1) giving
directions as to the type of illegal action which must be taken; or (2) undertaking legal action
for the specific purpose of rendering effective the later illegal activity. See id. at 234.
50 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-99 (1961) (finding mere abstract teaching
of Communist theory is not the same as preparing a group for violent action, and steeling it to
such action).
51 See Beschle, supra note 38, at 145 (arguing that Brandenburg restores most of
Holmes's position found within his articulation of the clear and present danger test, that "both
specific intent and imminence with respect to a non-speech evil are required in order to punish
speech").
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by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio.52 The Brandenburg Court held that
advocating the use of force could not be proscribed unless such advocacy was
directed at inciting imminent lawless action and was likely to do so.
53
Defendant54 was convicted under an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act for
pontificating that "if our [government] continues to suppress the white, Caucasian
race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken."55
The Court reasoned that the 'mere abstract teaching... of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.... ' A statute
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 56 The Court held the Ohio
statute unconstitutional because it failed to make this critical distinction, and
therefore punished not only the mere advocacy of action, but also assembly with
others to merely advocate a certain action.57
The Court subsequently addressed the imminence requirement of
Brandenburg in several cases, 58 including Hess v. Indiana.5 9 The Court in Hess
overturned defendant's disorderly conduct conviction because his speech did not
come within the narrowly limited classes of speech which a state may punish.60
The Court found Hess's words, "[w]e'll take the fucking street again," to amount
52 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
53 See id at 447.
54 One of twelve Ku Klux Klansmen gathered at a farm in Hamilton County, Ohio for a
protest. See id. at 445.
55 Id. at 446. Defendant went on to say that "[w]e are marching on Congress July the
Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two groups, one group to
march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi." Id.
56 Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
57 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The Court observed that "[t]he Act punishes persons
who 'advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety' of violence 'as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform'; or who publish or circulate or display any book or
paper containing such advocacy[,] ... " and concluded that the statute had failed to define the
crimes in terms of "mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless
action." Id. at 448-49.
58 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982) (holding the
words "if we catch any of you going in any of them damn racist stores, we're gonna break your
damn neck" to be protected under Brandenburg because the violent acts that followed the
speech occurred weeks or months thereafter); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969)
(holding the words "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights
is L.B.J." to be nothing more than crudely stating his opposition to the President, and thus
protected under the First Amendment).
59 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
60 See Hess, 414 U.S. at 106-09. Hess was involved in an antiwar demonstration that was
in the process of being dispersed by police, at which point Hess said to the sheriff, "We'll take
the fucking street again." Id. at 106-07.
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to no more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time.61 The
Court further required proof that Hess's "words were intended to
produce... imminent disorder." 62 Without such proof, the Court found Hess's
words protected by the First Amendment.
The Court has yet to address the "incitemenf' and "lawless" action prongs
subsequent to Brandenburg. Incitement, however, has previously been defined as
urging a person to do something rather than to merely believe something.63
Lawlessness, conversely, is a bit more difficult to define. The Court in this prong
of Brandenburg departed from the Dennis language.64 At least one commentator
perceives lawlessness to embody a requirement of serious harm.65 However, in
reaching this conclusion, one must look at the Court's determination of harm in
cases prior to Brandenburg.66 This would involve a comparison of harm
requirements that are at least semantically different.67 Therefore, the definition of
lawlessness can probably best be described as unsettled.
As this Comment describes the actual case involving Hit Man, it is important
to keep in mind the rationales underlying the First Amendment's treatment of
political speech, and the emergence of the modem political speech doctrine. This
Comment will now turn to the case of Paladin v. Rice.68
III. THE CASE OF PALADiN v RJCE
An understanding of the ramifications and ultimate niche that this decision
may occupy within First Amendment jurisprudence is strongly dependent on
familiarization with the facts presented in the case, and the reasoning used by the
district and circuit courts to reach their opposite conclusions. Both the facts and
61 See id. at 107. "Hess's statement was not directed to any person or group of persons, it
cannot be said that he was advocating, in the normal sense, any action." Id. at 108-09.
62 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
63 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,324-25 (1957).
64 Lawlessness may simply mean breaking the law, whereas Dennis requires serious
harm. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Thus, under Brandenburg, a speaker may be
punished for advocating jaywalking if such a result is imminent and likely. This result would be
improbable under Dennis, for the harm is not great enough.
65 See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 883,
968-69 (1991) ("[R]espondent must prove that the harm threatened was serious. Inciting
someone to walk on the grass in violation of a 'Stay off the Grass' sign would presumably not
suffice.").66 See id. (finding Brandenburg to require serious harm (citing Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951); Bridges v. Califomia, 314 U.S. 252 (1942); Whitney v. Califomia, 274
U.S. 357 (1927))).
67 Brandenburg assessed harm in terms of lawlessness, while Dennis assessed harm by
looking at the gravity of such harm discounted by its probability. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
68 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
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the reasoning used by the two courts are discussed below.
A. Facts and Stipulations
On the night of March 3, 1993, in Silver Springs, Maryland, James Perry
savagely murdered Mildred Horn and Janice Saunders by shooting them through
the eyes and strangled Ms. Horn's eight-year-old quadriplegic son, Trevor.69 This
gruesome story takes on a sickening twist when one learns that Mr. Perry was not
acting out of vengeance, but was instead hired by Lawrence Hom, Ms. Horn's ex-
husband and Trevor's father, to commit this brutal crime.70 Even more appalling
is the fact that Mr. Horn's greed was the driving force behind this crime-he
would receive the $2 million his son received in a settlement for injuries that
rendered him a permanent quadriplegic.7' In some measure of justice for the
surviving family members of the deceased, Mr. Perry and Mr. Horn have both
been convicted and sentenced accordingly.72 However, these convictions are not
the end of the story; for the purposes of the First Amendment, they are just the
beginning.
It appears that James Perry was not acting without assistance-a copy of Hit
Man73 was found in his apartment after the murders.74 Published by Paladin
69 See Rice, 128 F3d at 239.
70 See id.
71 See id
72 James Perry was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Lawrence
Horn was convicted of first degree murder and is serving a life sentence without the possibility
of parole. See Adam Cohen, Murder by the Book, TIE, Dec. 1, 1997, at 74; Kilpatrick, supra
note 3, at A21.
73 Hit Man is not a book easily found on the shelves of one's local library. The author of
this Comment had to order the book from Paladin Press, and, quite naturally, it is not expected
that the readers of this Comment will do the same. Therefore this Comment will generally cite
to the parts of Hit Man reported in the district and circuit court opinions, while occasionally
citing to very specific parts of the text not found in these opinions. However, if there is an
interest in obtaining a copy of Hit Man, then it can be ordered via credit card over the Internet
from Paladin's web site at < http:/www.paladin-press.com >. Irrespective of one's wishes to
purchase Hit Man, this website still provides a fascinating array of titles, along with links to
similar websites, that provide insight into the type of speech addressed by this Comment.
74 See id. Perry had purchased the book from a mail order catalogue distributed by
Paladin. Within this catalogue, Paladin described Hit Man in the following way:
Rex Feral kills for hire. Some consider him a criminal. Others think him a hero. In
truth, he is a lethal weapon aimed at those he hunts. He is a last recourse in these times
when laws are so twisted that justice goes unserved. He is a man who feels no twinge of
guilt at doing his job. He is aprofessional kiler.
Learn how a pro gets assignments, creates a false identity, makes a disposable
silencer, leaves the scene without a trace, watches his mark unobserved and more. Feral
reveals how to get in, do the job and get out without getting caught For academic study
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Press, Hit Man teaches the reader how to solicit business, choose a weapon, make
a silencer, perform the kill, dispose of the weapon, and much more-all in
explicit detail.75 Perry meticulously followed over twenty of Hit Man's
instructions76 on his way to becoming a killer for hire. Based on these facts,
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Paladin,77 asserting that Hit
Man aided and abetted78 Perry in his commission of the grisly triple homicide.
For the purpose of the appeal before the Fourth Circuit both parties stipulated
to a joint statement of facts.79 Paladin conceded for the purposes of the appeal80
that Perry followed a number of Hit Man's instructions in "planning, executing
and attempting to get away with" the murders on the night of March 3, 1993.81
Paladin further stipulated that they marketed Hit Man with an intent to attract and
assist criminals, and that they "intended and had knowledge that their publications
only.
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Md. 1996). Also found in Perry's
apartment was another Paladin book, How to Make a Disposable Silencer, Vol. I. See id. As
Hit Man contains a chapter on how to make silencers, the author will only discuss that book for
the purpose of this Comment.
75 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 235-39 (quoting Hit Man). The following passage is
representative of the brutal detail contained within Hit Man's pages describing what weapon to
use: "An ice pick can.. . be driven into the victim's brain, through the ear, after he has been
subdued. The wound hardly bleeds at all, and death is sometimes attributed to natural causes."
Id. at 237. In instructing the reader on how to kill, Hit Man teaches: "When using a small
caliber weapon like the 22, it is best to shoot from a distance of three to six feet. You will not
want to be at pointblank range to avoid having the victim's blood splatter on you or your
clothing." Id. To dispose of the corpse, Hit Man instructs the reader to "cut off the head ... and
blow the telltale dentition to smithereens! After this, authorities can't use the victim's dental
records to identify his remains." Id. at 238.
76 See idl at 239. Perry solicited a client through a friend, received his expense money up
front, killed the "mark" at home, used a rental car, placed stolen out-of-state license tags on that
car, used an AR-7 rifle with the serial numbers drilled out, killed the marks from between three
and six feet with several shots through the eyes, and disposed of the weapon by disassembling
it, and then scattering it throughout the countryside. See id. at 239-41. These are all specific
instructions found within the pages of Hit Man. See id. at 239-41. Additionally, Hit Man
specifically taught Perry how to build a silencer and make ballistic alterations to the AR-7 rifle.
See id at 240.
77 See id. at 241.
78 To be liable for aiding and abetting in Maryland, (1) the principal must perform a
wrongful act, (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal
or tortious activity at the time he provides assistance, and (3) the defendant must knowingly and
substantially aid the principal. See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 841-42
(D. Md. 1996).
79 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241 n.2 (citing Joint Statement of Facts [hereinafter J.S.]).
80 The parties specifically reserved the right to contest any stipulation contained in the J.S.
at any subsequent hearing. Id.
81 1d. (citing J.S. 6).
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would be used ... by criminals.. . to plan and execute the crime of murder for
hire, in the manner set forth in the publication." 82 Paladin has even stipulated that
by publishing and distributing Hit Man, they "assisted [Perry] in the subsequent
perpetration of the murders which are the subject of this litigation. ."83
Plaintiffs also stipulated for this appeal that Paladin's marketing strategy intended
to maximize sales, including sales for legitimate purposes to a number of
audiences. 84 Finally, plaintiffs stipulated that James Perry committed these
murders a year after receiving Hit Man.85
B. The Parties' Arguments
The sole issue decided by the court was whether the First Amendment, as a
matter of law, is a complete defense to the wrongful death action set forth by the
plaintiff.86
1. Rice's Position
Plaintiffs' contention at trial was that the speech contained within Hit Man
was not protected by the First Amendment, and in fact, aided and abetted James
Perry in killing Ms. Horn, her son, and Ms. Saunders. 87 Plaintiff's argument was
simply that the First Amendment does not protect communication aiding and
abetting murder.88 Underlying this position is the principle that speech, which in
its effect is tantamount to 'legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct,"89 is
itself legitimately proscribable if it is incidental to laws of general applicability.90
In other words, plaintiffs argued that Hit Man did not constitute speech, but rather
illegal conduct.
Alternatively, assuming Hit Man was deemed speech by the court, plaintiff
82 Id. (citing J.S. 4(b)).
83 Id. (citing J.S. 7).
84 See id. (citing J.S. 5(a)). Plaintiffs conceded for the purposes of appeal that as well as
being sold to the general public, Paladin marketed Hit Man toward several audiences including:
authors desiring information for the purposes of writing books about crime or criminals, law
enforcement officers and criminologists for the purpose of dissecting criminal methodology,
persons who fantasize about committing crimes but do not act on these desires, and persons
who enjoy this type of reading for entertainment purposes. See id.
85 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 847 (D. Md. 1996) (citing J.S.
2 and 6).
86 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233,241 (4th Cir. 1997).
87 See supra note 78.
88 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 842.
89 Rice, 128 F.3d at 243.
90 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding that the publisher
of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws).
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argued that the standard articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio91 does not apply to
the speech in question.92 Plaintiff argued that the Brandenburg standard only
applies to speech on issues of social and political importance, and that the speech
in Hit Man was neither.93 The appropriate standard, plaintiffs argued, is
established by analogy to New York Times v. Sullivan.94 This standard would not
protect speech if a speaker acts with a knowing and reckless disregard for human
life. 95
2. Paladin's Position
Paladin's position was quite simply that the First Amendment protects the
speech contained within Hit Man, and thus acts as a bar to any civil liability.96
Paladin argued that the First Amendment interests at stake in the case were to be
evaluated under Brandenburg.97 Thus, unless Paladin, by publishing Hit Man,
intended to produce imminent lawless action and was likely to produce such
action, the speech contained therein was protected under the First Amendment.98
Paladin concluded that unless they intended, through publication of Hit Man, for
James Perry to immediately go out and commit a triple murder, they were entitled
to First Amendment protection, which includes a bar to all civil and criminal
liability.99
C. The Rulings
1. The District Court
The district court's decision rested primarily on the application of
Brandenburg to the speech contained within Hit Man.100 The court interpreted
91 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
92 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841.
93 See id. at 845.
94 376 U.S. 254,283-88 (1964) (holding that a public official, in order to recover in a libel
action, must show actual malice, or that a statement was made with reckless disregard of
whether it was true or false). Plaintiffs sought to analogize damage of an individual's reputation
caused by the reckless disregard of a publisher, to physical damage done to an individual
caused by the same reckless disregard. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 843--44. The district court gave
this argument no credence, saying that New York Times "has no bearing on the facts of this
case." Id. at 844.
95 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844.
9 6 See Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233,241 (4th Cir. 1997).
97 See id. at 256.
98 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
9 9 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 242 (citing J.S. 4(c)).
100 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 845. The court did erroneously conclude that Maryland law
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Brandenburg to distinguish between speech "which merely advocates law
violation and speech which incites imminent lawless activity."'' The court thus
determined the question in this case to be whether "Hit Man merely advocates or
teaches murder or whether it incites or encourages murder."102 The court
concluded that Paladin, under the Brandenburg test, must have intended that
Perry would commit the triple murder immediately.10 3 The court found these
particular facts to lack the requisite intent,1 04 a "call to action," 10 5 and
immediacy; 0 6 and thus, concluded that Paladin and Hit Man were entitled to
First Amendment protection.'0 7
2. The Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court's granting of
summary judgment to Paladin, and remanded for trial.10 8 The court first
established that "abstract advocacy of lawlessness is protected speech under the
First Amendment."1 0 9 However, the court, by quoting Justice Black,1 10 noted that
did not recognize the tort of aiding and abetting. See id. at 842. However, this misinterpretation
does not affect the First Amendment analysis with which this Comment is concerned.
101 Id. at 845.
102 Id. at 845 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969)).
103 See id. at 847.
104 The court found that Paladin intended their books to be "purchased and actually used
by criminals," but that Paladin did not intend for James Perry to go out and commit a triple
murder immediately. Id.
105 The court noted that "[n]othing in the book says 'go out and commit murder now!'
Instead, the book seems to say, in so many words, 'if you want to be a hit man this is what you
need to do.' This is advocacy not incitement." Id.
106 The court emphasizes the context of the advocacy, saying that because books take time
to read, Hit Man "at worst ... amount[s] to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at
some indefinite future time." Id. at 848. Thus, it is not surprising that James Perry committed
his crimes a year after purchasing Hit Man.
10 7 See id.
108 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233,267 (4th Cir. 1997).
109 Rice, 128 F.3d at 243 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
110 Justice Black was a renowned supporter of the First Amendment. He stated:
The First Amendment is truly the heart of the Bill of Rights. The Framers balanced
its freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition against the needs of a
powerful central government, and decided that in those freedoms lies this nation's only
true security. They were not afraid for men to be free. We should not be.
Hugo L. Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 881 (1960); see also Harry Kalven,
Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428, 432
(1967) (summarizing Black's basic First Amendment philosophy as "[f]reedom of speech is
indivisible; unless we protect it for all, we will have it for none .... The choice for freedom of
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"it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech... to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part ... carried out
by means of [speech]." 1 1 If the First Amendment were to protect such "speech
brigaded by action,"112 the government would have no means to "protect the
public from... even the most pemicious ... civil wrongs." 113 The court
concluded that the "speech-act doctrine has long been invoked to sustain
convictions for aiding and abetting the commission of criminal offenses... [and]
that the First Amendment does not necessarily pose a bar to liability [when using
speech] for aiding and abetting a crime."'1 14
The first issue addressed by the circuit court was whether or not Hit Man is
best described as advocacy of illegal action or part of the "speech-act" doctrine. In
addressing this issue, the court necessarily understood Brandenburg to apply to
only critical, abstract discussion of existing laws, and not "speech which urges the
listeners to commit violations of current law."'1 15 The court reasoned that even if
"preparation and steeling is not per se unprotected," it may only be protected
within the context of "advocacy--speech that is part and parcel of political and
social discourse."1 16 Thus, according to the court, one can prepare and steel
"another to violent action not only through the dissident 'call to violence,' but
also through speech, such as instruction ... that does not... remotely resemble
advocacy."'1 17 The court finally concluded that Hit Man contained speech that
speech is a choice made once and for all by the Founding Fathers and is not subject to
reassessment in light of current anxieties."); Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living
Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 695-97 (1963) (observing that the Court's decisions in the
early 1950s, and their balancing of social interests, pushed Black further and further, until he
finally took an "absolute" view of the First Amendment);.
111 Rice, 128 F.3d at 243 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
498 (1949) (holding that picketing was an inseparable part of a single integrated and illegal
course of conduct and could thus be enjoined)). But see Reich, supra note 110, at 687, 717
(stating that Black's decision in Giboney came during a period when he basically attempted to
accommodate conflicting community interests; however, it was not until 1960 that Black had
firmly adopted the absolutist principle into his philosophy).
112 Rice, 128 F.3d at 244 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969)
(Douglas, J., concurring)). "Speech acts" exist where the speech is an integral part of criminal
conduct. See id. at 247 n.3 (citing Department of Justice, Report on the Availability of
Bombmaking Information, the Extent to Which Its Dissemination is Controlled by Federal Law,
and the Extent to Which Such Dissemination May Be Subject to Regulation Consistent with the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution (visited April 1997)
<http://www.jya.com/abi.htm> [hereinafter DOJ REPORT]. Such "speech acts" may be
regulated without First Amendment concerns because it is "merely incidental that such
'conduct' takes the form of speech." Id.
113 Rice, 128 F3d at 244.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 246.
1 16 Id. at 264.
117 Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
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could be considered advocacy.118
The Fourth Circuit further determined that Hit Man did indeed constitute a
"speech act," thus eliminating the First Amendment as a necessary bar to
imputation of civil liability.119 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on a
Ninth Circuit decision holding that the First Amendment is not a bar to criminal
aiding and abetting charges which arise from publication and distribution of
instructions on how to make illegal drugs.120 The court further relied on a series
of circuit court cases holding that the First Amendment is "generally inapplicable
to charges of aiding and abetting violations of the tax laws" 121 to support its
conclusion that Hit Man falls into the speech-act doctrine, and is thus not entitled
to an absolute First Amendment defense.
The court then addressed the extent to which the First Amendment exerts
influence upon the speech-act doctrine. The court concluded that, depending on
the context, the First Amendment may "superimpose... a heightened intent
requirement [upon the speech-act doctrine] in order [to preserve the] preeminent
values underlying [freedom of speech.]"122 These values are primarily concerned
with the "chilling of entirely innocent, lawfully useful speech [through the]
imposition of liability on the basis of mere foreseeability or knowledge that the
information one imparts could be misused for an impermissible purpose.' 12 3 The
court concluded that although a heightened intent may be needed in some
instances, there was no need to determine the scope of an intent-based limitation
because Paladin had stipulated to an intent that "would satisfy any heightened
standard that might be required by the First Amendment... [before] imposition
of liability for aiding and abetting through speech conduct."124
The circuit court then analyzed the facts of the case within the their First
Amendment framework, and concluded that even absent Paladin's express
stipulations, a reasonable jury could still find that Paladin aided and abetted James
1 18 See id.
1 19 See id. at 267.
120 See United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 843 (9th Cir. 1995). "The first amendment
does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply because the actor uses words to carry out
his illegal purpose." Id. at 842.
121 Rice, 128 F3d at 245-46; see also United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1185
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the sale of a computer program which aided illegal gambling was
not entitled to First Amendment protection unless the "speech was informational in a manner
removed from immediate connection to the commission of a specific criminal act"); United
States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1120 (1986)
("Tjhere will be some instances where speech is so close in time and substance to the ultimate
criminal conduct that no free speech defense is appropriate."); United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d
215, 217 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[Tjhe First Amendment... lends no protection to speech which
urges the listeners to commit violations of current law").
122 Rice, 128 F.3d at 247.
123 Id.
124 Id at 248.
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Perry. 125 The court found that the "number and extent of these parallels [between
the actual murders and] the instructions in Hit Man cannot be consigned ... to
mere coincidence... [and thus] creates a jury issue as to whether the book
provided substantial assistance." 126 The court also found that Hit Man
encouraged 127 Perry's acts, emboldening the killer by challenging his manhood at
every point where the potential murderer is confronted by reason or humanity. 128
The court finally held that, even absent any stipulations by Paladin, a jury could
reasonably find that Paladin acted with the heightened intent which the First
Amendment may impose on this fact situation.129 Thus, the court not only
concluded that the First Amendment does not bar plaintiffs action, but that the
facts themselves are capable of supporting a finding that Paladin aided and
abetted Perry in the murder of Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOuRTH CIRcuIT's DECISION
This analysis will focus on the Fourth Circuit's conclusions about Hit Man,
wholly separate from Paladin's stipulations.130 This analysis will primarily
examine the court's conclusion that a reasonable jury could find Paladin to have
the requisite intent to support civil liability under any heightened First
Amendment standard. 131 This Comment will also touch on the court's conclusion
that Hit Man did in fact "prepare and steel" James Perry to action. 32
125 See id. at 252.
12 6 Id.; see also id. at 264 (suggesting that the instructional manual must "prepare" another
for the commission of a criminal act, if such speech is to fall outside of Brandenburg scrutiny);
supra note 78 (a defendant must substantially aid the principal).
127 See id. at 264 (suggesting that the instructional manual must "steel" another to action
to fall outside the application of Brandenburg).
128 See id. at 252. The court reasons that through "powerful prose in the second person
and imperative voice, it encourages its readers in their specific acts of murder." The court
further concludes that "[t]he book is so effectively written that its protagonist seems actually to
be present [through the entirety] of the murders the book inspires."
129 See id. The court found four bases under which a reasonable jury could find that
Paladin possessed the requisite intent under Maryland law: (1) The declared purpose of the
book is to aid murder;, (2) Hit Matt's extensive promotion of murder is highly probative of
Paladin's intent; (3) Paladin's marketing strategy based on an inference from Paladin's
catalogue advertisement; and (4) Hit Man's only genuine use is the unlawful aim of facilitating
murders. See id. at 252-55; infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. One could argue that Paladin
effectively stipulated away their First Amendment defense, but this facet of the case is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
131 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 253.
132 See id. at 252.
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A. Creating a New Category of Speech
The Supreme Court has recognized several well-defined and narrowly
tailored classes of speech which receive little or no protection from the First
Amendment. 133 Additionally, the First Amendment has been understood to afford
little protection to speech which amounts to conduct because prohibiting such
conduct is thought to have only incidental effects on the freedom of speech.134
Thus, in order to find that Paladin was not entitled to summary judgment, the
Fourth Circuit needed to fit Hit Man into one of these classes of unprotected
speech, or deem it conduct.1 35 The court opted for the latter, saying Hit Man fell
into the speech-act doctrine. 136 However, this Comment contends that the court's
decision was predominantly motivated by certain factors indicating the creation of
a new class of unprotected speech rather than Hit Man's purported status as a
"speech act." To support this assertion, this Comment will examine the Fourth
Circuit's analysis related to the speech-act doctrine, Brandenburg, the value of
Hit Mat, and the societal harm created by Hit Man.
1. The Speech-Act Doctrine Analysis
There is no question that the speech-act doctrine motivated the court, but not
to the extent represented by the Fourth Circuit opinion. As previously discussed,
the court relied on several circuit court opinions which held that instructional
speech that aided and abetted criminal acts was not necessarily entitled to First
Amendment protection. 137 The court cited United States v. Barnett138 for the
general proposition that the First Amendment does not provide a defense to a
criminal charge simply because the actor used words to carry out his illegal
133 See supra note 7.
13 4 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("[A] sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms.").
135 Presumably the Court will first ask if the activity is speech or conduct, and then
determine, if necessary, whether the speech is protected or not. See Galloway, supra note 65, at
891-94 ('The first threshold question is whether the case implicates a communicative interest"
and then if the communications in question fall outside of First Amendment protections.); see
also Beschle, supra note 38, at 130 ("Asking whether activity is speech or conduct rather than
whether 'speech' is protected or unprotected merely changes the vocabulary used in close cases
without making the outcome any more certain."); Laurence J. Einstein & Steven Semararo,
Abortion Clinic Protest and the First Amendment, 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 221, 233
(1993) ("Distinctions between ... protected and unprotected [speech], which many courts and
scholars have recognized, cannot easily turn on whether something is 'speech' or 'conduct."').
136 See discussion, supra Part III.C.2.
137 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
138 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
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purpose.139 However, the court in Barnett did not need, nor did it attempt, to
determine when pure speech becomes part of the criminal act.140 The Ninth
Circuit did answer this question in United States v. Freeman,141 another decision
relied upon by the Fourth Circuit.142 Freeman held that for First Amendment
protection to evaporate, "the intent of the actor and the objective meaning of the
words [must be] used [in a manner] so close in time and purpose to a substantive
evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself."143 The Freeman court held
that the defendant was entitled to a Brandenburg instruction144 for twelve of the
fourteen criminal counts. 145 But for the two counts in which the defendant
actually prepared a draft of a tax return for false filing purposes, the court
concluded that the criminal act was so proximately tied to the speech that no First
Amendment defense existed.146
The Fourth Circuit correctly relies on Barnett for its articulation of the
general principles defining the relationship between the First Amendment and
criminal acts. However, the Fourth Circuit ignores the "proximity" requirement
articulated by the Ninth Circuit, saying that "[t]he principle of Barnett [is] that the
provision of instructions that aid and abet another in the commission of a criminal
offense is unprotected by the First Amendment .... -"147 This interpretation allows
the Fourth Circuit to classify Hit Man as aiding and abetting, even though its
publication occurred ten years before the Perry murders,148 and Perry was in
possession of Hit Man for a year before he committed murder.149 Indeed, Hit
Man did not verify Perry's "plan," buy his gun, or do anything that "solicit[ed] or
counsel[ed] violation of the law in an immediate sense."150 Thus, although the
court does consider Hit Man a speech-act in the form of aiding and abetting, this
conclusion is based on a tenuous application of the facts to a questionable
interpretation of the law, and may not even be supported by a case upon which
139 See id at 842.
140 The court was concerned with the existence of probable cause to support a search
rather than the defenses defendant may have used at trial. See id. at 843. The court did note that
the First Amendment did not provide a defense in this case, but did not define at what point the
First Amendment fails to provide a defense for the printed word. See id.
141 761 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1120 (1986).
142 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 1997).
143 Freeman, 761 F.2d at 552 (citing Barnett, 667 F.2d at 842-43) (emphasis added).
144 The defendant's speech is protected "unless both the intent of the speaker and the
tendency of his words was to produce or incite an imminent lawless act... ." Id at 552
(emphasis added).
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 1997).
148 Hit Man was published in 1983, and Perry committed the murders in 1993.
149 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
150 Freeman, 761 F.2d at 551-52.
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the court relies. 151
2. The Non-application ofBrandenburg
A better understanding of the court's decision can be gleaned from their
interpretation of Brandenburg, and how they felt it did not apply to this case.152
As already discussed, the Fourth Circuit understood the Brandenburg protections
of "imminence" and "incitement" to apply only to "mere abstract teaching" and
not teaching itself, or as the Fourth Circuit describes it, preparing and steeling.153
The court concluded that speech, absent advocacy, which prepares and steels
another to action154 receives less or no protection from the First Amendment.155
The fact that the court determined that Hit Man was not entitled to an
application of Brandenburg's protective test is consistent with the court's
conclusion that Paladin aided and abetted James Perry. The thorough discussion
and analysis of Brandenburg, however, is revealing of the court's true motives
because it indicates that they believed Hit Man to be speech. If this was conduct,
or a "speech act," a discussion of the applicability of Brandenburg would be
unnecessary, as nonexpressive and expressive conduct are governed by a different
line of cases. 156 Rather, the court understood that if Hit Man is considered speech,
then the court needed to pigeonhole it into an area of unprotected speech. The
court could not fit Hit Man into the Brandenburg category because its imminence
requirement, arguably the same criteria found in Freeman v. United States,157
would necessitate the conclusion that Hit Man was protected speech.158
151 A possible explanation for the court's choice of analysis is their perception of Hit Man
as utterly without value, and morally culpable for the murders at issue. See Beschle, supra note
38, at 134 ("If the primary focus is placed upon... [the moral blameworthiness of the actor],
then it seems logical to require only sufficient action on part of the defendant to corroborate his
intent, and to indicate that it is more than a passing whim.").
152 See Ric-, 128 F.3d at 263-65; see also discussion supra Part llI.C.2.
153 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 263-64; see also supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
154 The court referred to "instruction in the methods of terror or other crimes." Rice, 128
F.3d at 265.
155 See id.
1567Te first determination is whether the law proscribes conduct or communication, and
then whether it is protected speech. See supra note 135. If it were deemed conduct, the proper
analysis would be to determine if attaching liability to such words furthers a state interest
unrelated to the suppression of speech in a manner which is minimally restrictive upon First
Amendment freedoms. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968).
157 761 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985); see supra note 121.
15 8 See Avital T. Zer-Ilan, Case Note, The First Amendment and Murder Manuals, Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996)., 106 YALE L.J. 2697, 2700 (1997)
(arguing that "the Rice court was correct in holding that, under the Brandenburg test, Paladin
could not be held liable"). But see Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, How Imminent is Imminent?: The
Inminent Danger Test Applied to Murder Manuals, 8 SErON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 73 (1997)
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Therefore, the Fourth Circuit informally created another class of unprotected
speech out of necessity, which allowed them, in good conscience, to permit the
civil case against Paladin to proceed.
3. Hit Man's Value and Societal Harm
Relying upon valuelessness and grave societal harm indicates that a court
may be informally creating a class of less protected speech. The Supreme Court
has not expressly stated what speech characteristics may give rise to a new
category of unprotected speech, but the Court, when creating categories of lesser
protected speech, 159 generally refers to the speech's lack of value and societal
harm as important attributes. 160 The Court may also engage in a balancing
method, weighing the value of the speech against the interest in preventing the
harm associated with such speech, and maling the appropriate determination. 161
a. Valuelessness
In determining that Hit Man fell into a "new" class of speech and did not
merit First Amendment protection, the court emphasized two attributes of Hit
("Given the detail provided in these manuals, it is not entirely clear that they do not incite
immediate lawless action."); Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly
from Media Speech: A Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 231,261
(1992) (suggesting that a court may loosely interpret the "imminency requirement" where the
harm is grave enough, e.g., "solicitation of criminal action at a future ... date would be deemed
'imminent' notwithstanding the time lapse from the solicitation").
159 Or in a different parlance-what level of protection the speech shall receive?
160 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-64 (1982) (finding child pornography to
cause an extensive harm and to be of de minimis value, and thus concluding that child
pornography was without First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("[s]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality) (emphasis added); Ian A. Kass,
Note, Regulating Bomb Recipes on the Internet: Does First Amendment Law Permit the
Government to React to the Most Egregious Hanns?, 5 S. CAL. NTRDIsC. L.L 83, 85 (1996)
(arguing the level of protection wan-anted by the speech depends on factors such as "the
potential harm caused by it, and how much value the court places on the speech."); id at 93
(quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)) ("[T]he test for obscenity [is] whether
'the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."');
Einstein & Semararo, supra note 135, at 227 ('The level of First Amendment protection
accorded to speech... may also vary based on the type of speech as well as the type of harm
inflicted by the speech.").
161 See Radwan, supra note 158, at 48 ("One of the risks that society takes in allowing
free speech is the risk that some speech that causes harm will enter into the
marketplace... When such speech is at issue, a determination must be made regarding whether
its value is worth the danger that it presents to society.") (footnote omitted); Kass, supra note
160, at 94 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
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Man-its value and its potential harm.162 In determining that a reasonable jury
could find that Paladin specifically intended to assist murderers such as Perry, the
court strongly relied upon their judgment that "Hit Man's only genuine use is the
unlawful one of facilitating such murders."'163 The court proceeded to say that
"[i]f there is a publication that could be found to have no other use than to
facilitate unlawful conduct, then this would be it, so devoid is the book of any
political, social, entertainment or other legitimate discourse." 164 Thus, the
perceived absence of any social value from Hit Man is an important factor in
finding the requisite intent165 to support civil liability for aiding and abetting.
b. Societal Harm
Another important factor in determining the possible scope of Paladin's
liability is the potential societal harm "created" by Hit Man.166 The court's
emphasis on societal harm manifests itself in its assessment of the magnitude of
the governmental interest,167 thus, the greater the harm, the stronger the interest.
The government has a legitimate interest in preventing statutory violations, and
with murder, because of the grave harm, that interest is "incontrovertibly
compelling." 168 It follows that aiding and abetting a murder would create a
societal harm significant enough to give rise to a compelling governmental
interest in proscribing such "action." 169 Thus, culpability in aiding and abetting
cases is premised upon the defendant's "successful efforts to assist others in
accomplishing the crime," and not advocacy of criminal conduct. 170 Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit's decision to allow Paladin to be held civilly liable for aiding
and abetting is premised on the compelling governmental interest in punishing
and preventing social harm of the highest magnitude.
162 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 267. ("[Hit Man lacks] from its text... the kind of ideas for the
protection of which the First Amendment exists, and... [it] ... lack[s] ... even [an] arguably
legitimate purpose beyond the promotion and teaching of murder....
163 Id. at 255.
1 64 Id.
165 See infira notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
166 See Rice, 128 F.3d. at 244 (finding Hit Man to be a "textbook example" of teaching
methods of terror and, thus, beyond the protections of the First Amendment).
167 See id. at 243 (finding that speech which is tantamount to criminal conduct can be
legitimately proscribed, in essence, because the state has an interest in preventing that particular
harm).
168 Id. at 247.
169 See Radwan, supra note 158, at 72 ('There is no doubt that the state has a strong
interest in preventing speech which will cause a crime, particularly the crime of murder.").
170 See Rice, 128 F.3d. at 246.
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c. A New Category
Within the framework of its aiding and abetting analysis, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that Hit Man created a harm of such a magnitude as to create an
"incontrovertibly compelling interest" in its prevention. 171 The court proceeded to
establish that Hit Man contained speech utterly without redeeming value in order
to infer the requisite intent possessed by Paladin. 172 Under the guise of aiding and
abetting, the Fourth Circuit, in effect determined that Hit Man was valueless
speech, created a significant harm, and was thus not entitled to any protection
from the First Amendment. It appears that while the Fourth Circuit's proffered
reason for denying First Amendment protection to Hit Man rests upon weak
factual and legal ground, the underlying rationale based on the value and harm of
Hit Man stands on a much firmer factual basis. The court's stronger, although
unacknowledged, rationale relies upon similar attributes used by the Supreme
Court in creating classes of unprotected speech-valuelessness and significant
harm. This suggests that the Fourth Circuit did create a new class of unprotected
speech. 173
B. The "Bad Tendency Test": One Step Away
As it was shown in Part ]I.A, the Fourth Circuit appears to be creating a new
class of unprotected speech. Instructional speech 174 that prepares, steels, and is
devoid of advocacy, may receive less protection from the First Amendment than
other types of speech. The next question to be answered is by what evidence or
"test" the Fourth Circuit evaluated the speech contained within Hit Man. This
Comment argues that the court was applying the age-old "bad tendency" test most
clearly articulated in Debs v. United States.175 As previously discussed, Schenck
171 Id. at 247.
172 See id. at 255 ("If there is a publication that can be found to have no other use than to
facilitate unlawful conduct, then this would be it, so devoid is the book of political, social,
entertainment, or other legitimate discourse.").
173 The Fourth Circuit is not alone in thinking a new category of speech should be created
for instruction manuals of this type. See Kass, supra note 160, at 93 ("Perhaps the Court should
create a new exception for valueless speech that causes societal harm."); Zer-Ilan, supra note
158, at 2700-01 (arguing that "technical, detailed, step-by-step, do-it-yourself manuals should
be unprotected speech because of the likely severe harm to third parties and minimal social
value of such speech").
174 Instructional speech, for the purposes of this Comment, refers to the dissemination of
factual information in a step-by-step, "how-to" format. See Zer-Ilan, supra note 158, at 2700-
01. The author understands that defining instructional speech can become very problematic. See
infra note 225. However, this aspect of the Fourth Circuit's decision is beyond the scope of this
Comment. Therefore, for the purposes of analysis, this Comment will rely on the rather
simplistic definition given above.
175 249 U.S. 211 (1919); see supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text; Rabban, supra
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and Debs stand for the principle, as articulated by Holmes, that a speaker's intent
could be inferred from the natural tendency and probable consequences of that
speech, 76 as well as "suggesting that the encouragement need not be direct. '177
The Fourth Circuit does not purport to use the "bad tendency" test anywhere
in its opinion. Nonetheless, at the core of their analysis, one cannot help but find
Debs lurking under the cover of the speech-act doctrine.178 The Court in Debs (1)
inferred intent from the tendency of Debs's words, and (2) determined the
criminality of his act through the tendency of his words to do harm.179
Comparatively, the Fourth Circuit inferred that Paladin, stipulations aside, had the
requisite civil intent based on the tendency of Hit Man's words.180 The court also
required that, within the context of aiding and abetting, there be an overt criminal
act.181 The court further inferred from the tendency of the speech contained
within Hit Man that Paladin assisted and encouraged Perry in the perpetration of
his criminal conduct.182 Thus, there are differences between the Hit Man case and
Debs, but this Comment will show these differences to be insignificant. This
Comment will argue that the Fourth Circuit inferred intent from Hit Man's words,
and that the court would not, in a different context, require an overt act to impose
liability. Finally, this Comment will show that the Fourth Circuit implicitly
thought the tendency of Hit Man's words was sufficient to infer criminal intent
1. Inferring Intentfrom Hit Man 's Words
The Fourth Circuit held that summary judgment was inappropriate because a
trier of fact could conclude that Paladin acted with the requisite intent to support
civil liability.1 83 The court found that this decision could rest collectively, and
possibly individually on four bases.184 This Comment will discuss and examine
note 5, at 1276 ('In Schenck [and] Debs [Holmes] judged the intent requirement of the
Espionage Act by the tendency of the words rather than through an attempt to uncover the
defendants' actual states of mind.").
176 See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text; see also Rabban, supra note 5, at 1264
(CHolmes stated that evaluating the tendency of language as evidence of the speaker's intent is a
principle 'too well established too manifestly good sense to need the citation of books.'")
(quoting Debs, 249 U.S. at 216).
177 Rabban, supra note 5, at 1264.
178 The conduct in this case being civil aiding and abetting.
17 9 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
180 See id; see also supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. The court, in coming to
this conclusion, put significant weight on the utter lack of value found within Hit Man's pages.
181 See id; see also supra discussion Part II.A. The court required this aspect for the
purposes of their "harm" analysis.
182 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 252.
183 See id at 253.
184 See id.; see also supra note 129.
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each of these bases in turn to show that the Fourth Circuit was using the tendency
ofHit Man's speech to infer Paladin's intent.
The first pillar, which would support a jury conclusion that Hit Man
possessed the requisite intent, is Hit Man's declared purpose as "an instruction
book on murder. '185 The court stated that the a jury could conclude from such
"prominent and unequivocal statements of criminal purpose that the publisher
who disseminated the book intended to assist in the achievement of that
purpose."186 This, however, allows a jury to infer intent from the tendency of the
words. Paladin may want to teach murder for a variety of reasons, and indeed
both parties have stipulated that there are audiences to whom Hit Man serves a
legitimate purpose.187 Because there is not an undeniable intent, a jury, in
determining that Paladin intended to assist in murder, would have to find intent
from the natural tendency of Hit Man's words.
Second, the court cited Hit Man's "extensive, decided, and pointed
promotion of murder" as "highly probative of the publisher's intent. ..."188 The
court found that Hit Man "so overtly promotes murder... [by] boldly
proselytizing and glamorizing the crime," that a reasonable jury could infer that
Paladin possessed the requisite intent.189 Promotion of an act cannot be sufficient
to find intent for the overt act, unless one concludes that the tendency of the
words promoting the act are dispositive of intent to perpetrate the subsequent
overt act. 190 Eugene V. Debs promoted his anti-war message during a speech to
supporters, and was found to possess the necessary criminal intent for conspiracy
to obstruct the draft based on the tendency of his words.' 91 Although Debs's
words were "less concrete" than Hit Man's, the underlying principle remains-to
get from promotion to intent, the court needs to evaluate the tendency of the
speech.
Third, the court concluded that Paladin's marketing strategy and target
audience-criminals and would-be criminals-could support a finding of the
185 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 256.
186 Id. at 253.
187 See supra note 84.
188 Rice, 128 F.3d at 253.
189 See id.
190 For example, if one strongly promotes a keg party, it is not necessarily true that she
intends to breach the peace. However, such intent could be inferred from the tendency of such
parties to be loud and disruptive to neighbors. Paladin's case is a bit different in that they
figuratively promoted the keg party and the keg party happened. However, promotion of an act
does not necessarily mean the speaker desires the event to occur. One may promote the making
of nuclear weapons for the purpose of showing how easily available such information is. See
infra note 231. One may similarly promote murder for the purpose of alerting law enforcement
personnel to certain techniques used by contract killers.
191 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,214-16 (1919).
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requisite intent.192 But, such a conclusion about Paladin's target audience would
need to be based on "Hit Man's seemingly exclusive purpose to assist murderers
in the commission of murder .... "193 Again, one would necessarily have to infer
from the words of Hit Man an exclusive purpose, particularly in the light of the
parties' stipulations that Paladin had several legitimate target audiences. 194
Because the derivation of intent from the marketing strategy is based on a purpose
found from the tendency of the words, the court is again applying the "bad
tendency" test.
The final prop, and the perhaps the most distressing, upon which a
determination of Paladin's intent may properly rest is that "Hit Man's only
genuine use is the unlawful one of facilitating murders." 195 The court determined
that a jury would be reasonable in rejecting any of Paladin's "hypothesized lawful
purposes" because Hit Man is devoid of legitimate discourse, and thus its only
genuine use is illegitimate.' 96 Such an absence of lawful uses can only be inferred
from the tendency of Hit Man's words. Paladin can put forth several legitimate
purposes, but the jury can ultimately determine that the tendency of the speech
indicates only an illegitimate use, and thus, infer possession of the requisite intent
by Paladin.
2. The Overt Act
In the case at issue, the Fourth Circuit required occurrence of the actual
criminal act which Hit Man's words "tended" to produce. Conversely, the "bad
tendency" test punishes words with a tendency to produce a certain result, but
does not require that the actual overt act occur.197 However, the overt act is
important in this case only because the civil claim is for aiding and abetting a
murder, and thus the criminal overt act is a prerequisite to imposition of liability.
In a criminal prosecution for attempt, conspiracy or solicitation, the overt act
becomes the publication and dissemination of the instructional manual.198
Therefore, if Paladin were charged criminally, then the occurrence of an actual
murder would be inconsequential to prosecution, at least for criminal conspiracy
or attempt. 199 Further, the language used by the Fourth Circuit does suggest that
192 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 254.
193 Id.
194 See supra note 84.
195 Rice, 128 F.3d at 255.
196 See discussion, supra Part Ill.A.
197 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919) (finding that successful
completion of an act should not be the test where the tendency of the speech indicates an intent
to bring about that act).
198 See infra note 205.
199 See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (noting that Schenck was charged with conspiring to
obstruct the draft with the overt act being the publication and distribution of the pamphlet);
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Paladin possessed the requisite criminal intent,200 and could thus be subject to
criminal charges. Therefore, while the court is implicitly using the bad tendency
test in a civil case, this may set the stage for explicit implementation of the bad
tendency test in a criminal case.
3. Paladin 's Intent: Sufficient for Criminal Prosecution?
In Schenck, Debs, and other cases from that era, the "bad tendency" test was
used to infer intent in a criminal setting. The current case arises out of a civil
wrongful death action. As previously discussed, however, the court nonetheless
applied the "bad tendency" test.20 1 The important question to resolve in this
context is whether the intent inferred from the tendency of Hit Man's words is
sufficient to support criminal liability because such liability allows for the
prosecution of words alone. It is the position of this Comment that the Fourth
Circuit believed Paladin to possess the requisite intent for criminal prosecution.
The Model Penal Code202 imposes criminal liability for criminal
solicitation203 if "a person... with the purpose204 of promoting [the commission
of a crime] ... encourages... another person to engage in specific conduct that
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,211 (1919) (noting that Debs was charged with attempt to
obstruct the recruiting and enlisting service of the United States, with the overt act being his
speech).
200 See discussion infra notes 201-13 and accompanying text.
201 See supra Part III.B.
202 Promulgated the by American Law Institute in 1962, with its sole purpose being the
control of harmful conduct through clear concept and expression. See C. McClain, Criminal
Law Reform: Historical Development in the United States, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE, 510-12 (1983).
203 There are three other ways to punish the dissemination of bombmaking information
criminally: conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and teaching or demonstrating bombmaking
techniques. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 112, at 14. As there was no agreement between
Paladin and James Perry, a conspiracy charge is not a real possibility. See id. at 15. Further,
under aiding and abetting law, it would be impossible to punish the speech alone, without an
overt act such as Perry's in this instance. See id. at 20. Moreover, there is no federal statute
dealing with attempt to aid and abet a federal offense. See id. Finally, the DOJ Report concludes
that the only Federal statute dealing with teaching or demonstrating a "technique capable of
death" could be tenuously applied, at best, to the speech involved in Hit Man. See id. at 22-23
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)). The DOJ Report concluded that criminal solicitation would be a
difficult crime with which to prosecute instructional speech because Federal law requires the
solicitor to endeavor to persuade, and proof of circumstances strongly corroborative of the
solicitor's intent. See id. at 16. However, the Fourth Circuit's conclusions would still likely
support imposition of liability upon Paladin for criminal solicitation. See infra notes 206-13 and
accompanying text
204 "A person acts purposely ... if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a
result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i).
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would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime .... -"205 The
Fourth Circuit found a jury could reasonably conclude that Paladin encouraged
Perry in his specific "murderous acts."'20 6 Further, the court concluded that the
purpose to facilitate murder could be inferred from the tendency of Hit Man's
speech.207 Thus, all elements of criminal solicitation are present in this case, if the
court's understanding of "purpose" in this factual context is the same as it is in
criminal trials.
The Fourth Circuit did not formally rule on the question of criminal intent,
but from its discussion of criminal intent in the context of criminal aiding and
abetting, it is clear that they considered Paladin to possess the requisite intent to
support criminal liability. Relying on Judge Learned Hand, the court understood
the difference208 between civil and criminal intent in aiding and abetting law to be
that the "civil tort requires only that the criminal conduct be the 'natural
consequence of [one's] original act,' whereas criminal intent.., requires that the
defendant have a 'purposive attitude' towards the commission of the crime."20 9
The court then concluded "that plaintiffs have more than met their burden in
establishing... [a genuine issue of] fact as to Paladin's intent" even assuming a
heightened intent requirement imposed by the First Amendment.210 This
language suggests that Paladin's intent was sufficient to support criminal liability
because it met a heightened intent. The court, in citing to several criminal
205 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02. Under Federal law, criminal solicitation is defined as
follows:
Whoever, with the intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony
that has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and
under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent solicits, commands, induces, or
otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct shall be
imprisoned ....
18 U.S.C. § 373(a). The Federal requirement of "endeavors to persuade" may be analogous to
the Model Penal Code's requirements of "promotion" and encouragement. If this is the case,
then Paladin would be criminally liable under Federal law for criminal solicitation. See infra
note 206 and accompanying text.
206 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 252 (4th Cir. 1997)("hrough
powerful prose in the second person and imperative voice, [Hit Man] encourages its readers in
their specific acts of murder."). The court also observed that "[t]he book is so effectively written
that the protagonist seems actually to be present at the planning, commission, and cover-up of
the murders the book inspires." Id.
207 See id. at 253; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
208 The court recognizes that the only possible difference between criminal and civil
aiding and abetting is the intent requirement. See id. at 251.
2 09 Id. at 251 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938)); see also
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (adopting Judge Hand's view).
210 Rice, 128 F.3d at 251-52 (emphasis added).
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cases,211 stated that heightened intent requires a speaker to act "with the purpose
of assisting."212 Further, in establishing that Paladin could be subject to civil
liability, the court assumed that any speech which the "government may
criminally prosecute with... no concern for the First Amendment, the
government may likewise... make subject to private causes of action."213 Thus,
in analyzing the court's attempt to distinguish criminal and civil intent, it is
reasonable to conclude that Paladin was acting with sufficient intent to support
criminal liability in the Fourth Circuit.
Therefore, it becomes clear that the Fourth Circuit implicitly created a new
category of speech including, at a minimum, instructional manuals that teach
criminal conduct. Further, such speech will receive no protection from civil or
criminal liability if its tendency is to create illegal conduct-irrespective of the
speaker's specific intent. This understanding of First Amendment law affords
little First Amendment protection to "dangerous" persons or groups.
V. THE FUTURE OF INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH
A. Within the Context of a "National Emergency"
First Amendment protections have been limited in times of perceived
national emergency through repressive legislation, which have generally been
upheld by the Court during specific times of panic.214 Landmark cases of this era
of "less protection" include Schenck, Debs, and Dennis.215 With the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the end to the Cold War, and correspondingly, the Red Scare,
leaders and citizens began to perceive a new threat to the nation's security-
terrorism.216 Specifically, tragedies at Ruby Ridge2 17 and the Branch Davidian
211 See id. at 248 (citing United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985); Barnett v. United States 667 F.2d 835
(9th Cir. 1982)).
212 Id. at 248.
213 Rice, 128 F.3d at 247.
214 See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Anendnent in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1442-43
(1962) (arguing that no matter how much First Amendment protections have been retracted, we
must always be prepared to see them reduced further "if the needs of 'security' increase-or if
an atmosphere of fear and hysteria makes them seem to increase"); Robert Plotkin, First
Amendment Challenges to the Membership and Advocacy Provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 623, 632 (1996) ("Strong protection
of seditious activity is... a relatively recent phenomenon."). See also discussion supra notes
18-46 and accompanying text.
2 15 See supra notes 18-46 and accompanying text.
216 See Plotkin, supra note 214.
2 17 A shootout in Naples, Idaho between militiaman Randy Weaver and FBI agents
resulting in the deaths of a federal agent, and Weaver's wife and son. See Michael L. Rowady,
Comment, Wolverine Fear: An Inside Look at the Citizen Militia Movement in Michigan, 74 U.
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compound in Waco218 thrust militia groups into the public consciousness.
Subsequently, bombings of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and
Olympic Park in Atlanta created the current perception among citizens and public
officials that militia groups pose a serious threat to the domestic security.2 19
In response to this recent domestic terrorism, Congress may enact a law
prohibiting the dissemination of bombmaking instructions. 220 Under the Fourth
Circuit's tacit approach, if a "Bombmaking Instructional Manual" existed, such a
publication could be subject to criminal prosecution for solicitation because the
tendency of its words is to produce bombs. The likely targets of such a law would
generally be militia groups and their speech advocating violent action against an
overly vast and powerful government they feel has lost touch with the people.221
It is within this context that this Comment will identify and evaluate possible
DEr. MERCY L. REv. 771,787-89 (1997).
218 The FBI and Branch Davidians engaged in a fifty-one day stand-off before the FBI
commenced action, prompting the Davidians to set their compound on fire, resulting in the
deaths of seventy-five Davidians. See id. at 789-90.
219See id. at 801-07 ("[The prevailing view among many Americans is that militia
groups are extreme, deranged and threatening [because] ... [m]any believe the Oklahoma City
bombing, the most horrifying and largest mass murder in American History, emerged directly
out of the... [militia] movement in America."); id. at 801 ("If not for Oklahoma City,
the... [militia] movement would have been dismissed by most Americans as just another
harmless political outcry.").
220 In fact, Congress required the Attorney General to conduct a study determining the
constitutionality of restricting the dissemination of bombmaking instructional materials. See
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 844, 110 Stat. 1214,
1297 [hereinafter AEDPA]. The results of the Attorney General's efforts are found in the DOJ
Report, supra note 112. Acting on the advice of the DOJ Report, Congress has moved to
prohibit the dissemination of bombmaking instructions, with the Senate passing the Feinstein
Amendment by a count of 94-0, which would amend 18 U.S.C. § 842(1)(2), to read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person:
(A) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device,
or a weapon of mass destruction, or to distribute by any means information pertaining to,
in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device, or weapon
of mass destruction, with the intention that the teaching, demonstration, or information be
used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense or a
State or local criminal offense affecting interstate commerce.
S. 936, 105th Cong. (1997).
221 See Reger, supra note 18, at 287 ("In 1995 ... Montana militia members recruited all
good 'patriots' to protect the people of Ravalli County from a 'tyrannical' government....');
id. at 296 ("[A] growing number of Americans feel their constitutional liberties are threatened
by a vast federal government, [and] some of these individuals seek to challenge this [perceived]
abuse of government power by turning to militia groups."); Rowady, supra note 217, at 801
("In effect, nothing short of massive and revolutionary change will satisfy the masses of
[militia] .... ").
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ramifications of the Fourth Circuit's decision.
B. Implications of the Fourth Circuit's Decision
The "bad tendency" test protects less speech than its contemporary
counterpart found in Brandenburg.2 22 Whereas Brandenburg allows speech
unless it is likely to incite imminent lawless action, the "bad tendency" test
protects speech unless it has a natural tendency to cause lawless action. By not
demanding a temporal connection between speech and possible conduct the "bad
tendency" test does not protect as much speech as Brandenburg. The facts of
Paladin v. Rice illustrate this principle, as the publication of Hit Man occurred ten
years before the action it "tended" to cause. It is exactly the type of speech found
in Hit Man which gives rise to the most serious concerns about the Fourth
Circuit's "new" approach to the First Amendment.223
These serious concerns arise when Congress enacts laws aimed at
suppressing militia speech in response to domestic concems.224 Specifically, if
the Fourth Circuit is willing to extend criminal liability to bombmaking
instructions that parallel Hit Man, then the scope of the class of unprotected
speech becomes important.225 If the class is confined to a set of facts similar to
Hit Man-pure instructional speech-then the ramifications of the Fourth
Circuit's approach will be minimized in terms of a loss of protected speech.
However, if this new class of speech is defined broadly, the Fourth Circuit will
likely suppress significant amounts of formerly protected speech. The Fourth
Circuit may attempt to limit suppression of political speech by considering the
value of the speech z26 However, this methodology will necessarily involve ad
2 22 See Kalven, supra note 33, at 236 n.6, 238 (arguing "Debs ... makes little sense and
impeache[d] claims to serious freedom of speech" and that the law "may have finally worked
itself pure with Brandenburg.").
223 See Smith, supra note 14, at 349 (observing that historically, in tense or troubled times
the government may be more willing to classify speech as "radically subversive" and thus
unprotected, and that courts have tended to uphold these restrictions on speech, often over
"dissents containing eloquent and passionate free speech rhetoric").
224 See, e.g., the Feinstein Amendment, supra note 220.
22 5 But see Sandra Davidson, Blood Money: When Media Expose Others to Risk ofBodily
Harm, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 225, 243 (arguing the real difficulty lies in defining
"how to" books, because "any well-written, easy to understand work of fiction that explains the
activities that are occurring could be used as a manual .... The clearer the expression, the
easier the book (or television show or movie) would be to follow as a model").
226 The "bad tendency" test looks only at the harm certain speech may create. See supra
note 37. By looking at the value of the speech and weighing it against the tendency of the
speech to do harm, the Fourth Circuit could conceivably protect political speech. Numerically
speaking, by looking solely at harm, a court is in effect saying that the speech's value has no
weight, or a value of zero. Thus, for any speech, if the harm was determined by a court to be
one or greater, then that speech would not be protected: 1 > 0. However, if value is added to the
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hoc balancing, which is no better than other alternatives. The possible scope of
the Fourth Circuit's approach is discussed below.
1. Confined to the Facts of the Present Case
The Fourth Circuit's unwillingness to offer First Amendment protections to
certain types of instructional speech may not extend beyond the facts of this case.
If this were so, the Fourth Circuit would only apply its implicit "bad tendency"
test to pure instructional speech.227 This approach would certainly limit the
amount of speech subject to various types of liability as compared to the
alternatives.2 28 However, this approach could still result in the regulation of
speech considered to be at the core of First Amendment protections-dissident
political speech.229
Even if the court embraces a narrow understanding of its "new" category of
unprotected speech, suppression of political philosophy can still occur. It simply
cannot be assumed that instructional speech is void of political content.230 It is
quite possible instructions themselves constitute political advocacy, even
bombmaking instructions.2 31 If the ideology of a certain militia, or especially
equation, then speech with a harm of one may not be protected if its value is greater than one: I
< 2. Therefore, consideration of the speech's value may lead to protection for speech which
would have otherwise been proscribed.
227 See supra note 174. Within this Comment's definition of instructional speech, Hit Man
is probably best described as pure instructional speech, and for the sake of this argument, the
author will assume as much.
228 See infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
229 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Whitney v.
Califomia, 2-74 U.S. 357, 374 (1926) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring) ("[A] State is,
ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic, and political
doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil
consequence."); Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 139 (observing that political speech is "deemed
of such central importance to the functions of the First Amendment" that only the highest
probability of a reprehensible evil will justify any suppression).
230 Cf Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) ("[S]peech is not stripped of First
Amendment protection merely because it appears in [a commercial] form."). The Court went
on to conclude that an advertisement for abortion services pertained to the constitutional
interests of the general public, which coincided with the speaker's First Amendment interests.
See id. at 822.
231 See Erwin Knoll, The H-Bomb and the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
705 (1994) (observing that an article disclosing instructions on how to make an H-bomb was
published in The Progressive, a magazine "adamantly opposed to war and militarism," in an
effort to dispel certain myths associated with the bomb). The author, Howard Morland, sought
to dispel the "H-bomb secret" myth by showing it was not a secret at all. See id. Morland also
sought to show that the "secret" could not be "written down on the back of an envelope [ ] or in
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anarchists, is tied to rising up against the government or creating disorder, then
specific bombmaking instructions may themselves express a political
statement.2 32 Expressing political beliefs may not motivate the dissemination of
most instructional speech, but in some rare instances, such dissemination can
function as a mode for expressing political viewpoints.
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit is utterly unequipped to distinguish among
the various types of instructional speech. As a result, it erroneously relies on the
tendency of instructional speech to do harm. This test punishes instructional
speech, whether it solely communicates methods of murder or whether it
passionately expresses political dissent. The Supreme Court has recognized only
one narrow type of speech which elicits a harm great enough to obviate the
content of the speech-child pornography.233 The Court noted that the speech
need not be obscene, it merely had to depict a child in a certain fashion, thus
harming the child each and every time this material was produced.2 34 The Fourth
Circuit, however, is far from concluding that a definable harm will occur each
time the instructional speech found in Hit Man is produced, the Fourth Circuit
only looked at the tendency of such words to produce harm. By employing the
"bad tendency" test, the Fourth Circuit simply ignored whether or not regulation
of instructional speech implicated core First Amendment values. This approach is
simply inconsonant with First Amendment jurisprudence.
2. Beyond the Facts of the Present Case
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's approach towards instructional speech
probably extends beyond the facts of the present case. The Fourth Circuit, through
its implicit application of the "bad tendency" test, has determined that the
a magazine article[ ]," but rather that building an H-bomb was a monstrous task capable of
being undertaken only by large govemments. Id. at 706. Mr. Knoll was the editor of The
Progressive at the time Mr. Morland sought to publish his article.
Along the same lines, one could publish an instructional manual describing methods of
civil disobedience, which may describe certain types of illegal conduct. This type of manual
could be for the sole purpose of expressing dissatisfaction with the government. Further, Hit
Man could conceivably constitute an extreme statement on anything from vigilantism to
overpopulation.
232 See Kass, supra note 160, at 93 (arguing that if the writer explained her views of
society and the rationale behind the dissemination of bombmaking recipes then such speech
would have political value); supra note 231.
233 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding child pomography unprotected
under the First Amendment). The Court came to this conclusion because in every instance in
which this speech was made, a child was harmed. See id. at 759. There is no such finding in this
case, and any speculation as to this point is without foundation.
234 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 ("[T]he nature of the harm to be combated requires the
state offense be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a
specified age.") (emphasis added).
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touchstone for First Amendment protection is the ultimate harm that the speech
may bring about. Thus, the Fourth Circuit would deny protection to instructional
speech irrespective of context, if the words had a tendency to produce harm. The
court articulated this principle in concluding that the First Amendment is
generally inapplicable to aiding and abetting laws,235 in which the court strongly
relied upon Freeman v. United States.236 Importantly, the Freeman court noted
that speech which contained both instruction and advocacy could still be
prosecuted for aiding and abetting. 237 This reliance is consistent with the
importance the Fourth Circuit places on the tendency of words to cause harm, and
leads to the conclusion that the presence of unprotected instructional speech
"trumps" traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.
This emphasis by the Fourth Circuit on the harm instructional speech may
create gives rise to serious First Amendment concems.238 A manifesto urging
opposition to the government for a variety of political reasons, that happens to
include a recipe for a fertilizer bomb,239 may be criminally prosecuted based on
the tendency of the words to create harm. Further, a manifesto with similar
overtones, that contains a reference to bombmaking instructions,240 may also be
235 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233,245 (4th Cir. 1997).
236 761 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985).
2 37 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 245 (citing Freeman, 761 F.2d at 552).
2 38 See supra note 226.
2 39 For example, to make a pipe bomb all one needs to do is:
1. Drill a 1.5 cm hole through the pipe cap.
2. Drill a 3-5 mm hole through the pipe.
3. Glue a membrane, that can be dissolved with acid, in place over top of the
hole in the pipe. The thickness of the membrane determines the delay time.
4. Place the cap on the pipe, aligning the two holes.
5. Fill the pipe with 80% potassium permanganate and 20% sugar mixture.
6. Tape the pipe to a board to prevent rolling.
7. Fill the top hole (the hole in the cap separated from the hole in the pipe by the
membrane) with sulfiric acid.
8. When the sulfuric acid contacts with the mixture a violent explosion will
occur.
See SEYMOuR LECKER, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES: HOW TO MAKE YOUR OWN, 36-37 (1985).
240 For example, one should consult The Terrorist's Handbook for an excellent guide to
producing bombs from start to finish. The Terrorist's Handbook can be found on the Intemet at
a certain website--i.e., <www.bomb.com>. It is important to note that focusing on the
tendency of words to do harm treats a reference to bombmaking instructions the same as actual
dissemination of such instructions. Each has the tendency to cause the same harm. The
Terrorist's Handbook, e.g., provides more detailed and sophisticated bombmaking instructions
than those found in LECKER, supra note 239. Interestingly, the availability of The Terrorist's
Handbook on the Intemet may have helped motivate passage of the Feinstein Amendment. See
Adam R. Kegley, Note, Regulation of the Internet: The Application of Established
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prosecuted. However, within the context of a political manifesto, it is hard to
imagine a more definitive, effective expression of one's ideology than through the
inclusion of bombmaking instructions.241 Yet the Fourth Circuit may be willing
to proscribe this type of speech, along with all other speech found within the same
document-political speech included-because this speech could assist another
in the production and use of a bomb. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's approach has the
potential, if extended beyond the facts of the present case, to withdrawal First
Amendment protections from substantial amounts of speech.
Even assuming that the Fourth Circuit chooses not to focus solely on harm,
the implications of an alternative approach are also unsavory. If the Fourth Circuit
chooses a different approach, then it likely will opt to engage in balancing,
weighing the value of the speech and its societal harm, in determining its
categorization.242 However, this will not result in a principled approach to a
Constitutional Law to Dangerous Electronic Communication, 85 KY. LJ. 997, 1003 (1996)
("Senator Edward Kennedy waved a 76-page 'Terrorist's Handbook' ... downloaded from the
Internet, ... explain[ing] that it contained instructions for... the ammonium nitrate bomb used
in Oklahoma [City.]") (footnote omitted).
241 See Thomas B. Mcaffee, Constitutional Limits on Regulating Private Militia Groups,
58 MONT. L. REV. 45, 74 (1997) ("[M]ilitias have engaged in political discourse, ranging from
statements of pure political ideology to predictions and advocacy of violent confrontation with
the government"). If one was advocating violent confrontation with the government, then the
inclusion of bombmaking instructions could indicate the strength of one's political convictions
by expressing ultimate commitment to one's ideology in a manner beyond the mere meaning of
words. In essence, instructional speech may allow militias to say "not only do we believe the
government to be overly vast, but we have the capacity to do something about it, so you should
take us seriously." This idea is obviously context dependent, in that one would probably need to
indicate that the instructional speech was designed for this purpose. A manifesto advocating
violent confrontation with the government would provide sufficient context.
Similarly, the author certainly does not intend for any readers of this Comment to attempt
assembly of a pipe bomb, but rather included this information for its emotive function in
communicating the notion that this type of speech should not necessarily be proscribed. See
supra note 239. It seems clear to the author that within the context of this Comment, a reader
would be hard-pressed to construe note 239 as anything but advocating protection for
instructional speech in some instances. However, under the Fourth Circuit's approach, intent to
cause assembly and use of pipe bombs would be imputed to the author based on the tendency of
the instructions. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[L]inguistic expression
serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise,
detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well."). The Court in Cohen held
that although the defendant had a myriad of alternatives, he was still entitled to express his
beliefs through use of the words 'fuck the draft." Id. (emphasis added). For an excellent review
of Cohen, see William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1595
(1987).
242 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 967 (1987) (observing that "over the past decade [1977-1987] the Court has resorted
to balancing in First Amendment cases with increasing frequency"). It would seem logical for a
court to balance the governmental interests-harm--against the interests of the public in
receiving such speech-value-to reach a conclusion under the First Amendment. See New
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determination of what speech is protected by the First Amendment, for balancing
bestows standardless discretion upon a court. 243 This discretion comes from a
court's assessment of the interests to be balanced, which in essence allows a court
to reach whatever conclusion it wishes about the speech through the proper
"weighing" of the competing interests.244 Essentially, the court could, through the
balancing of value and harm, protect the speech it subjectively wants to protect
and throw to the wolves the speech it deems deserving of such a fate.245
Perhaps the ultimate significance of the Fourth Circuit's approach to the First
Amendment lies in their willingness to allow the majority to pass judgment on
dissident speech.2 46 In a criminal proceeding for dissemination of bombmaking
information a jury will be asked to examine the content of the speech and
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-67 (1982) (holding New York statute criminalizing
distribution of child pornography constitutional because "the
evil ... restricted... ovenvhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake").
Further, the Fourth Circuit does place emphasis on Hit Man's harm and value in reaching its
conclusion. See supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
243 It is important to note that there are two types of balancing: definitional and ad hoe.
Definitional balancing creates a rule based on the value of the competing interests such that no
more weighing needs to be done. Ad hoc balancing looks at the weights of the competing
interests in each case, much like a common law approach. One may argue that definitional
balancing does not lead to the same uncertainty that ad hoc balancing creates and is thus an
effective tool with which the judiciary can decide cases. See MELVIN NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.03, at 2-17 (1984). However, definitional balancing will essentially
break down into ad hoc balancing as soon as the court is willing to consider interests of
different degree from their previous decisions. See Aleinikoff, supra note 242, at 980 (arguing
that there is a "artificiality of the distinction between 'definitional' and 'ad hoc' balancing[,]
[because] [n]ew situations present new interests, and different weights for old interests," and if
the court reopens the balancing process for these interests, every case becomes one of ad hoc
balancing).
For example, in one instance, the court may determine the societal harm-occurrences
similar to the Oklahoma City bombing-to be so great as to outweigh any value the speech
may possess and accordingly afford no protection to the speech. This would be definitional
balancing. However, if similar speech with higher value and with relatively low harm, comes
before the court, they may be tempted to protect such speech, even though definitional
balancing would preclude any further consideration of value and harm. This is ad hoc
balancing.244 See Black, supra note 110, at 878 ('The great danger of the judiciary balancing
process is that in times of emergency and stress it gives Government the power to do what it
thinks necessary to protect itself, regardless of the rights of individuals.").
245 This becomes truly frightening when one understands that this balancing approach
offers no floor beneath which First Amendment freedoms cannot sink. See Frantz, supra note
214, at 1442 ("No matter how low [the floor] may fall .... [it can always] fall still further [in
times ofnational emergency.]").
246 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e are
satisfied ajury could readily find that the provided instructions... have no... noninstructional
communicative value.. .').
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determine guilt or innocence. The "bad tendency" test will allow the jury, without
the restraints of an imminence requirement, to infer intent from the tendency of
the speaker's words-words that they may find reprehensible. The Espionage Act
and Smith Act granted the juries such power, and they rarely, if ever, passed up
an opportunity to condemn words with which they disagreed, despite the absurdly
remote possibility that the words would lead to action.247 The Fourth Circuit's
decision is, unfortunately, the first step backwards to a time when speech was
permissible only if the majority permitted it.
C. A Better Solution
While the Fourth Circuit was busy revitalizing a First Amendment doctrine
that, by today's standards, affords minimal protection to speech, the court was at
the same time ignoring existing First Amendment doctrines that can competently
siphon unprotected instructional speech from protected instructional speech. The
important distinction that can be drawn between unprotected and protected
instructional speech is the speech's expressive element.2 48 Such a distinction
247 See generally Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919). Perhaps the most egregious conviction occurred in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Defendants were convicted of conspiring to unlawfully utter, print,
write, and publish:
1. Disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of the Government of the
United States;
2. Language intended to bring the form of the Government of the United States into
contempt and disrepute;
3. Language intended to incite, provoke, and encourage resistance to the United
States in their war with Germany;
4. Language intended to urge, incite, and advocate curtailment of production of
things necessary to the prosecution of the war, such as ammunition.
See id. at 617. Defendants were five Russians opposed to the United States' military movement
into Russia during World War I, which they viewed as an attempt to interfere with the Russian
Revolution. See id. at 629-31. Defendants accordingly urged the general strike of workers in
ammunition factories. See id. at 624. The Court upheld their convictions, acknowledging that
their intent may have been to aid the cause of the Russian Revolution, but that the tendency of
their speech was to inhibit the United States' prosecution of the war against Germany. See id.
248 The Court has derived several "lines in the sand" between unprotected and protected
speech. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, 'Clear and Present Danger' Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1184-85 (1970) (noting that Justice Black
defined expression within the First Amendment concept of speech by drawing a line between
constitutionally protected speech and unlawful conduct, while "Justice Douglas has settled on
the phrase 'speech brigaded with action."); see also Cohen v. California, 463 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) (holding emotive as well as cognitive speech protected under the First Amendment).
These distinctions are handy monikers, but one still needs to assess the expressive content
of the speech to reach a conclusion. For the purposes of this Comment, non-expressive speech
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would subject expressive instructional speech to traditional First Amendment
protections-including those found in Brandenburg.249  Nonexpressive
instructional speech would be dealt with through application of a test similar to
those developed for conduct and commercial speech. This approach preserves the
fundamental values underlying the First Amendment.2 50
The practicality of this approach to instructional speech is evident as the
Supreme Court has made this distinction in several areas with relative ease. The
Court has explicitly recognized a difference between expressive and
nonexpressive conduct,25 1 and has at least implicitly recognized the difference
between expressive and nonexpressive speech.252 The Court, in making this
will refer to purely factual communication. Expressive speech, conversely, is everything that is
non-expressive. Expressive generally refers to communications of beliefs or opinions, or
communication which lends emotive force to one's beliefs or opinions. For example, the
comment "Andy Katzenmoyer is the best linebacker in football because of his size, speed,
strength, and nose for the ball" would be communicating an idea or opinion, while the comment
"Ohio State beat Michigan 50-14" would be communicating purely a fact, not an idea or
opinion. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit also observed a difference between noninstructional
and instructional communications. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 249.
While absolute distinctions may not necessarily be well-tailored for application to other
types of speech, such a distinction is particularly apt for intructional speech. Such speech, as
this Comment has defined it, necessarily communicates factual information in the form of step-
by-step instructions. Therefore, the proper judicial inquiry should be whether such speech
expresses beliefs or lends force to certain beliefs. If a court answers this question affirmatively,
then there is a sufficient communicative component to deem such speech expressive. Cf
Spencev. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (finding that conduct provides sufficient
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play when there is "[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message and... the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it").
249 The Court has undertaken a much stricter review of government regulation of
expressive speech because it clearly understands that the expression of ideas and opinions are at
the core of First Amendment values. See supra note 229. Thus, a regulation proscribing
expressive speech and conduct will only be upheld if such speech falls into one of the
traditional categories of unprotected speech. See supra note 7. Moreover, the only category of
unprotected speech which is applicable to instructional speech is those words which incite
imminent lawless action. Thus, if the Court determines certain instructional speech to be
essentially expressive in nature, it should apply the Brandenburg test to determine the existence
of First Amendment protections.
250 See supra note 229.
251 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967) (holding that the act of burning a
draft card was primarily nonexpressive conduct, and could therefore be more easily punished
than expressive conduct or symbolic speech).
252 Commercial speech can be considered nonexpressive speech. See Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (holding
that "[t]he First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) ("The free flow of purely factual commercial
information is indispensable to the market economy."). Political speech can clearly be
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distinction, has extended significant First Amendment protections to expressive
conduct and speech.253 Conversely, nonexpressive speech and conduct have been
afforded less First Amendment protection by the Court.254 Thus, it would appear
that nonexpressive instructional speech should receive less protection from the
First Amendment than expressive instructional speech.
This Comment's approach has two advantages over the "bad tendency" test
adopted by the Fourth Circuit. First, this approach allows a court to extend
traditional First Amendment protections to instructional speech when such speech
is political in nature. Second, this approach involves no definitional or ad hoc
balancing of the attributes of specific speech. These advantages will now be
discussed in turn.
1. The Capacity to Protect Political Speech
The approach advocated by this Comment has the flexibility to protect
instructional speech of a political nature, whereas the Fourth Circuit's "bad
tendency" approach lacks the capacity to make such a distinction. 255 As it has
considered expressive speech. Advocacy, by its nature, requires the espousal of a particular
idea, opinion, or belief.
253 Generally expressive conduct and speech cannot be proscribed unless they fall into a
category of unprotected speech. See supra note 7; see also, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (holding flag-burning to be expressive conduct and thus subject to First Amendment
protection); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding expression through the use of
offensive words subject to First Amendment protections).
254 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (holding that lawful and nonmisleading
commercial speech can be proscribed if the regulation directly furthers a substantial
governmental interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978) (finding the Constitution to
accord lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (holding that if the regulation furthers a substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, which only minimally
implicates First Amendment freedoms, then such regulation would be constitutional).
Generally, the rationale behind the Court's willingness to allow regulation of
nonexpressive speech and conduct relies on the notion that suppression of such speech will not
have a chilling effect on speech. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24
('The truth of commercial speech ... may be more easily verifiable... [and s]ince advertising
is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and foregone entirely.") (emphasis added). Further, the Court has carefully crafted
the standards which apply to nonexpressive communication to prohibit governmental
regulations that implicate First Amendment freedoms in a manner more extensive than
necessary. Thus, the Court has understood nonexpressive communication to be further away
from core First Amendment values than expressive communication, and has accordingly
allowed the government greater latitude in regulating such speech.
255 If all the court is concerned about is the tendency of the words to do harm, then the
value of the speech is irrelevant. See supra note 226.
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been argued, instructional speech can have political value standing alone,256 or in
the right context.257 While the Fourth Circuit would merely look at the tendency
of such speech to do harm, this Comment's approach would evaluate such speech
as political speech, accordingly determining if the words are likely to incite
imminent lawless action.258 In practice, this approach would likely protect the
speech found in The Progressive59 while allowing for restriction of the speech
found in Hit Man.260 This Comment's approach is therefore superior to the
Fourth Circuit's jurisprudence because the former approach properly adheres to
the core values of the First Amendment-protection of dissident political
256 See supra note 231.
257 See supra note 241.
258 This difference does indeed lead to a significant amount of additional protection for
instructional speech. The Fourth Circuit will only look at the tendency of the words to decide if,
as a matter of law, the speech is protected. If the Fourth Circuit determines no protection is
necessary, then a jury will decide whether the speech contains "noninstructional
communications." See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997).
However, under this Comment's approach, a court must determine as a matter of law (1)
whether the speech is expressive or nonexpressive, and (2) whether the speech is protected
under the appropriate First Amendment doctrine. Thus, this Comment's approach significantly
reduces the opportunity for the majority to pass judgment on speech which it may find
appalling.
259 See supra note 231. Such speech was clearly meant to express an opinion, or more
appropriately, to add greater force to the author's opinion. Under this Comment's approach,
such speech would be evaluated under Brandenburg. Since converting H-bomb instructions
into an actual H-bomb takes significant amounts of time and capital, it can hardly be said to
promote imminent lawlessness. Thus, such speech would be protected.
Similarly, a political manifesto advocating revolt against an overly vast government may
be able to demonstrate, through the inclusion of bombmaking instructions, a passion for its
tenets unable to be captured through ordinary writing. Again, using this Comment's approach,
this speech would be evaluated under Brandenburg. Determining whether such speech is
protected would probably tum on two factors: (1) the medium (a flyer may only take a few
minutes to read as compared to a full manifesto) and (2) type of instructions (a pipe bomb could
be assembled in a few days, but more complex bombs may take significantly longer).
260The instructional speech found in Hit Man may arguably be described as
nonexpressive communication. Arguably, the type of communication found in Hit Man does
not involve the espousal of any ideas or opinions, but is instead concemed solely with imparting
information upon the reader for the purposes of committing an act. Further, such instructional
speech is being packaged in the form of a book and sold to consumers, thus adding to the
"sturdiness" of the speech. Thus, the speech in Hit Man should arguably be judged by the same
standard the Court has applied to other nonexpressive communications. This standard inquires
as to whether the government action furthers a substantial interest in a direct way which only
minimally implicates the First Amendment concerns for expressive communication. Under this
standard, it is clear that the government has a substantial interest in preventing murder, and
restricting murder manuals probably furthers this interest in a manner that only minimally
implicates First Amendment values.
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speech.261
2. No Definitional or Ad Hoc Balancing
As discussed, the Fourth Circuit may look beyond the harm of specific
instructional speech and engage in balancing in an effort to protect political
speech. This will bestow tremendous discretion upon a court, and will likely
break down into ad hoc balancing.262 This Comment's approach, however,
commits a court to an absolute decision--does this instructional speech contain
an expressive element? A court therefore is constrained from evaluating value and
harm, at least superficially, and correspondingly, discretion vested in a given
judge is decreased.263 Removing discretion from a court, at least as a matter of
degree, is generally advantageous to First Amendment freedoms.
The Fourth Circuit's approach would likely have a significant chilling effect
because the extent to which specific instructional speech would receive protection
is dependent upon balancing. In order to ascertain the potential protection, a
publisher would need to determine how a court would evaluate the specific
instructional speech.264 This would necessarily lead to extensive uncertainty,
which in turn creates a chilling effect.2 65 This Comment's approach, conversely,
provides speakers with an absolute test-is this speech expressive? While this
approach still allows for judicial discretion to some degree, it provides speakers
greater certainty in evaluating the likelihood of liability attaching to such speech.
Reducing the chilling effect associated with a certain type of speech is
unquestionably harmonious with First Amendment values.266
261 See supra note 228.
262 See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
263 This Comment does realize the discretion will still reside within a court if it adopts the
advocated approach. Certainly a court could label speech it "values" as expressive, and speech
it fears as non-expressive. However, this approach will eventually develop precedent, which
should lead to certain defined areas of the law. Once this occurs, a court will be obliged to rule a
certain way, thus ultimately removing discretion from the judiciary over time. See Frantz, supra
note 214, at 1435 ("Consequently, in cases falling clearly within the defined areas, the definer
[the judge] is largely relieved of responsibility for results in particular instances which he may
find personally distasteful.").
2 64 See Frantz, supra note 214, at 1443 ("Whether one ha[s] a right to speak or publish
cannot be known until after the event and depends on the unpredictable weight which a court
may someday give to 'competing interests.").
265 Because a publisher is uncertain of the type of protection certain speech may receive,
the publisher may simply decide not to publish, thus avoiding any liability risk. See Frantz,
supra note 214, at 1443 (explaining that "many... will be deterred merely by the pervasive and
ineradicable uncertainty" from engaging in protected speech).
266 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997)
("[agueness... raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling
effect on free speech."); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 409 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
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VI. CONCLUSION
At the outset, this Comment posed the question: Is the First Amendment a
parasol or an umbrella? Concededly, the speech found in Hit Man, and especially
the result, challenge, and almost defy the most staunch First Amendment literalist
to argue for its protection. However, in a rush to condemn Hit Man, the Fourth
Circuit implicitly revived a methodology discordant to core First Amendment
values-the "bad tendency" test. The significance of this approach surfaces as
one understands the context within which we are living, and what groups pose the
greatest perceived threat to domestic security. Within this context, it is likely that
the government will enact restrictions on certain types of instructional speech-
namely that speech which is most closely related to militias. Armed with the "bad
tendency" test, it is doubtful that the Fourth Circuit would do anything but uphold
these speech restrictions, even if they directly affected political speech. Thus, it
appears that the First Amendment is but a parasol in the Fourth Circuit.
Unfortunately, in their hurry to send Hit Man to civil trial, the Fourth Circuit
overlooked, or maybe simply chose to ignore, existing First Amendment
doctrines that have the capacity to sort protected instructional speech from the
unprotected. The judiciary need only to examine the expressive content of the
speech, and make a determination as to whether it is expressive or nonexpressive.
Expressive speech should be scrutinized under traditional First Amendment
doctrines, while nonexpressive speech should be reviewed under the same types
of relaxed standards applied to conduct and commercial speech. Within this
approach, a court can extend Brandenburg protections to politically instructional
speech, while treating nonexpressive instructional speech similarly to conduct.
This approach should be used by future courts when confronted with a restriction
upon instructional speech, for it understands and appreciates that the First
Amendment is intended to function not as a parasol, but as an umbrella.
dissenting) ("[We] allow [for] the invalidation of facially overbroad statutes to guard against a
chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech."); Frantz, supra note
214, at 1443 ("[T]he Court condemns statutes which, because of their breadth or vagueness,
deter protected speech.").
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